docs(prd): add PRD 0016 — Attack your own infrastructure, safely, and only your own - #65
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… only your own Every other module observes. This one ACTS ON A TARGET, which makes authorization and blast radius the whole design problem rather than a section of it. The value is real — a running application has vulnerabilities emerging from configuration, routing and middleware order that no source analysis reveals, and code-scanner's sast subsystem is explicitly pattern-level and says so. Three hazards dominate. Testing something you do not own — a typo'd hostname, a shared CDN address, a stale DNS record — is a legal problem, not a bug. Breaking the thing you are testing, by fuzzing an endpoint that sends emails or charges cards, means the security tool caused the outage. And findings without reproducible evidence generate work rather than value. Hence: an explicit target allowlist with no scan-what-you-find mode, ownership verification re-checked before every run, refusal with NO OVERRIDE FLAG for unverified targets — an override would be used exactly once, by someone in a hurry, against someone else's server — safety profiles defaulting to the safest, and an abort when the target starts returning 5xx. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
vu1nz Security Review0 finding(s) in PR #? No security issues found. |
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Specification for the
pentest-enginecore module, listed inPRD.mdand not yet specified.Every other module observes. This one ACTS ON A TARGET, which makes authorization and blast radius the whole design problem rather than a section of it.
The value is real — a running application has vulnerabilities emerging from configuration, routing and middleware order that no source analysis reveals, and code-scanner's sast subsystem is explicitly pattern-level and says so.
Three hazards dominate. Testing something you do not own — a typo'd hostname, a shared CDN address, a stale DNS record — is a legal problem, not a bug. Breaking the thing you are testing, by fuzzing an endpoint that sends emails or charges cards, means the security tool caused the outage. And findings without reproducible evidence generate work rather than value.
Hence: an explicit target allowlist with no scan-what-you-find mode, ownership verification re-checked before every run, refusal with NO OVERRIDE FLAG for unverified targets — an override would be used exactly once, by someone in a hurry, against someone else's server — safety profiles defaulting to the safest, and an abort when the target starts returning 5xx.
Spec only — no implementation in this PR.